Bajada, C., Melatos, Karlan & Morduch 2017, Principles of Economics (1st edition), McGraw-Hill, Australia.
Johar, M., Maruyama, S. & Truong, J. 2017, 'The contribution of Western fast food to fast-growing body mass in China', Applied Economics, vol. 49, no. 8, pp. 797-811.
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The westernization of Asian countries has led to the rapid expansion of Western-style fast-food restaurants, which are believed to be fueling an unprecedented rise in body mass in these countries. This study tests this belief using longitudinal data from China. Exploiting the opening of a Western-style fast-food restaurant in a particular community, we conduct a transition analysis to make a more convincing causal interpretation than the standard cross-sectional or fixed-effects approach. Considering several measures of fatness, we find no robust evidence of Western fast food having a substantial effect overall, but there is some indication of effect heterogeneity.
© 2016 Elsevier B.V.This paper analyzes sequential negotiations with exogenous breakdown risk between a risk-neutral seller and a loss-averse buyer who is privately informed about his valuation. I show that, compared to the risk-neutral benchmark, loss aversion on the buyer's side softens the rent-efficiency trade-off for the seller. The reason is that the higher the buyer's valuation is, the more he has to lose by rejecting the seller's offer. Thus, in equilibrium the seller's profits and overall efficiency are both higher than in the risk-neutral case. Moreover, I also show that loss aversion has a redistributive effect by increasing the equilibrium payoff of some low-valuation buyers and decreasing that of high-valuation ones.
When an agent's motivation is sensitive to how his supervisor thinks about the agent's competence, the supervisor has to take into account both informational and expressive contents of her message to the agent. This paper shows that the supervisor can credibly express her trust in the agent's ability only by being unclear about what to do. Suggesting what to do, i.e., "directives," could reveal the supervisor's "distrust" and reduce the agent's equilibrium effort level even though it provides useful information about the decision environment. There is also an equilibrium in which directives are neutral in expressive content. However, it is shown that neologism proofness favors equilibria in which directives are double-edged swords.